Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala

Citation - Writ Petition (Civil) No. 373 of 2006, 2018 (8) SCJ 609

Court - Supreme Court of India

Bench - Dipak Misra, A.M. Khanwilkar, R.F. Nariman, D.Y. Chandrachud and Indu Malhotra

Date of Judgement - 28.09.2018

Facts of the Case

Women of menstrual age were denied entry to the Sabarimala sanctuary, one of Kerala's most important temples. Bindu and Kanaka Durga, both in their early 40s, attempted to access the hilltop shrine around 3.45 a.m. but were denied owing to threats of physical harm.

In the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, a group of five women from the Indian Young Lawyers Association filed a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) contesting the temple officials' century-old restrictive practise. Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Worship (Authorization of Entry) Rules, 1965, states that "Women who are not permitted to join a site of public worship by tradition and use shall not be entitled to enter or offer worship in any place of public worship," was argued to be a violation of the Indian Constitution's basic fundamental rights.

Issues

1. Whether this restriction imposed by the temple authorities violates Articles 15, 25 and 26 of the Indian Constitution?
2. Whether this restriction violate the provisions of the Kerala Hindu Place of Public Worship Act, 1965?
3. Whether the Sabarimala Temple has a denominational character?

Laws

1. Articles 15(3) of the Constitution of India
2. Articles 14 of the Constitution of India
3. Article 17 of the Constitution of India
4. Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Worship (Authorization of Entry) Act, 1965

Arguments made by the petitioners

Senior Counsel Indira Jaising argued that the widespread social stigmas that label menstruation women as "impure" and "polluting" are both provocative and damaging. Due to the dogmas surrounding menstruation in general, preventing women from attending the temple is a type of untouchability. According to the lawyer, there is a violation of Article 17 of the Indian Constitution, which condemns and outlaws all forms of untouchability. On the question of whether the Sabarimala temple has a denominational character, the counsel argued that the religious rituals performed in the temple during 'pujas' and other religious rites are comparable to those performed in any other Hindu temple.

Senior Advocate Raju Ramachandran, who was nominated as an amicus curiae in the case, claimed that Article 25(2) (b) is a substantive right, not only an enabling provision. The above-mentioned Article grants women the right to enter the temple and give worship.

Contentions made by the Respondents

The Nair Service Society's senior counsel, K. Parasaran, stated right away that the limits put on women were not the result of patriarchal beliefs. Instead, the practise was founded on the god Lord Ayyappan's celibacy. Kerala has a matrilineal structure, according to the lawyer. The state's women are noted for being well-educated and self-sufficient in their decision-making responsibilities. As a result, he maintained that the prohibition enforced on young women was the outcome of Sabarimala temple norms and usages, not misogyny. Furthermore, the defendant's lawyer pointed out that temples are not specifically mentioned in Article 15(2) of the Indian Constitution, which grants individuals the right to access public areas.

J. Sai Deepak, who represents "People for Dharma," a group dedicated to keeping the government and temple management apart, chastised the opposing counsel for failing to distinguish between religious diversity and prejudice. The petitioner, he argued, twisted a conversation about the deity's celibacy into purported concepts of impurity related to menstruation.

The decision of the Court

On September 28, 2018, the Supreme Court removed the prohibition, allowing women of all ages to visit the Sabarimala shrine in Kerala. The tribunal ruled with a 4:1 majority that the temple practise violates Hindu women's rights and that prohibiting women from entering the shrine is gender discrimination.

The majority verdict reveals that the Indian Constitution's essential principles are superior. Even in questions of religious beliefs, the Hon'ble Chief Justice and his companion judges unambiguously said that governments, religious communities, and citizens are obliged and must comply with the country's Constitution. All other laws of the land, as well as customary customs, beliefs, and traditions of other religions, are superseded by this historic judgement.

Dissenting opinion

Justice Indu Malhotra wrote the dissenting opinion. The Justice dismissed the petition as frivolous and unworthy of consideration, arguing that courts lack jurisdiction to decide whether religious activities should be abolished unless there are issues of social ills, such as 'Sati.' According to Justice Malhotra, constitutional morality would allow everyone to practise their views, and the religious community would decide what constituted vital religious practise.

Indu Malhotra carefully says in her dissenting view that the decision to eliminate the prohibitions on women would have significant repercussions, amounting to undue meddling in religious emotions of many communities.

Article 25 of India's Constitution protects both the temple and the deity, according to her claim. She believes that religious practises should not be judged exclusively on the basis of Article 14.

In Re: Prashant Bhushan and Anr. Alleged Contemnor(S), Suo Motu Contempt Petition (Crl.) No.1 OF 2020

Case Number - Suo Motu Contempt Petition (Crl.) No.1 OF 2020

Bench - Arun Mishra, B. R. Gavai and Krishna Murari

Date - August 14, 2020

Facts of the Case

Prashant Bhushan, the contemnor, is a senior counsel who has spent more than three decades pursuing public interest litigation in a number of high-profile cases. On July 22, 2020, a petition was filed in the Supreme Court of India against him and Twitter Inc., calling to the Court's attention two tweets issued by Prashant Bhushan. The purported tweets, which were directed against the Chief Justice of India (CJI) and the Supreme Court, revealed a deterioration in the judiciary's independence and the Supreme Court's role in safeguarding Indian democracy. Twitter finally took down the tweets. The Court filed suo moto contempt proceedings against Prashant Bhushan on July 22, 2020, claiming that his tweets were defamatory.

Issues

1. Whether the tweets published by Mr. Prashant Bhushan are healthy criticism of the Indian judiciary or has dashed the public confidence in the institution of the supreme court?
2. Whether these tweets were against the CJI's as Individuals or CJI's as the CJI of the Supreme Court?
3. Whether the acts of Twitter Inc. have also tampered the reputation of the Indian judicial system?

Laws

1. Article 19(1), Constitution of India
2. Article 129, Constitution of India
3. Article 142 (2) (5), Constitution of India

Arguments

During the hearing, Prashant Bhushan clarified that the initial tweet was intended to express his outrage at the inconsistency between the CJI's reckless attitude in riding a motorcycle without a mask while also preventing the SC from physically functioning and hearing cases during the COVID-19 lockdown. He further claimed that the contempt proceedings were an attempt to restrict free speech and a violation of the Indian Constitution's Article 19(1)(a). Prashant Bhushan argued that the second tweet was a genuine expression of his views on the Court's (and previous four CJIs) role in undermining democratic ideals in the last six years (since the ruling BJP party came to power), and that it could not be considered contempt because it was protected under the Indian Constitution.

According to established Supreme Court of India conventions, the CJI is the 'Master of the Roster,' with the authority to assign cases to judges. The use of this authority by CJIs to facilitate the rise of authoritarianism, majoritarianism, and the suffocation of dissent in the country has been brought into question in the past. In that context, Prashant Bhushan contended that raising issues about the way CJIs behave themselves in their individual roles does not constitute scandalising the Court. As a result, the tweets cannot be claimed to be interfering with the administration of justice or the due course of justice by the Court.

Judgement

The Court began by asserting that there is a strong link between comments influencing judges' strict performance of their duties and their ability to obstruct the administration of justice. It stated that such insinuations (as in the present case) implicitly degraded the Court's dignity and amounted to eroding public faith in judges' integrity by looking back at precedents. By doing so, the Court necessarily associated criticism of judges with criticism of the Court, dismissing Prashant Bhushan's contention that comments about judges' individual conduct had no bearing on the administration of justice.

The Court, on the other hand, tried to make a key distinction. It was noted that while vilifying a judge as a judge merits contempt, vilifying a judge as an individual does not; in such circumstances, judges are left to seek private remedies. To adjudicate contempt cases, it primarily relied on six elements proposed by Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer in Re: S. Mulgaokar, (1978) 3 SCC 339: (i) prudent use of the Court's contempt power, (ii) balancing constitutional values of free speech and the need for fearless curial process, (iii) separating personal protection of libelled judges from community confidence in the prevention of obstruction of justice, (iv) discretionary exercise of authority, (v) not being hypersensitive even when criticisms exceed limits, and (vi) declaring contempt in cases of malicious, scurrilous, intimidatory, or threatening conduct beyond acceptable limit.

The Court then went into a study of the tweets, using Justice V.R. Iyer's multifold tests as a guide. It split them into multiple pieces, noticing that the initial section of the first tweet ('CJI rides a 50 lakh motorcycle belonging to a BJP leader without a mask or helmet at Raj Bhavan, Nagpur without a mask or helmet') was a personal attack on the CJI as an individual. The second half of the initial tweet, however, was an 'undisputed' attack on CJI in his function as administrative head of the judiciary ('at a time when he puts the SC in lockdown mode, depriving citizens their fundamental rights to access justice').

It's worth noting that the Court found various problems in the initial tweet's factual correctness. Despite being physically unable to function, the Court was able to carry out its duties via video conferencing facilities during the period of the disputed tweets. According to the Court, a "patently false" and "wild charge" about the CJI has the potential to shatter public trust in the judiciary as well as undermine the authority and administration of justice in that setting. As a result, the Court dismissed Prashant Bhushan's claim of genuine criticism based on his distress about the courts' physical non-functioning.

The Court issued three observations in response to the second tweet. First, Prashant Bhushan's statement that the Supreme Court had played a significant role in allowing the breakdown of democracy, as well as the role of the previous four CJIs in sustaining it, was a direct attack on the Supreme Court and the CJI. Second, the Court determined that Prashant Bhushan acted irresponsibly, and that the tweets were not qualified for good faith protection, based on the vast reach of the tweet and the character of the contemnor (who is a lawyer).

The tweets had the impact of dissuading an ordinary applicant and risked losing faith in the Supreme Court and the CJI when taken together. The Court also concluded that if it failed to protect itself from vicious insinuations like the one in this instance, it would open the floodgates to other judges facing similar attacks. Preventing malicious attacks was, in effect, a matter of national honour and reputation in the community of countries, and it had to be handled with determination. Prashant Bhushan was found guilty of contempt of the court by the Supreme Court.

Regarding Twitter's role in the contempt proceedings, the Court discharged the social media site as an intermediary, taking cognizance of its action in suspending tweets in July after receiving notice from the Court. According to a number of campaigners, the company created a hazardous precedent that could apply to future defamation claims. Twitter stated in a statement that it was committed to defending free speech in India and around the world.

Prashant Bhushan asked the Court to have the proceedings invalidated on procedural grounds following an adjudication by the Court on August 14, 2020, in which the Court found Prashant Bhushan guilty of contempt claiming that a copy of the complaint on the basis of which the suo motu notice was issued was not served on him. He also challenged the decision on other grounds, including vagueness (due to inconsistency with other Court decisions on the subject), free speech, truth (as a defence), the principle of proportionality (tilting the balance in favour of rights over restrictions), and an attempt to compel him to apologise.

Given the widespread public debate that followed the Supreme Court's decision, the Court decided on some of the aforementioned points in its sentencing order of August 31, 2020. It determined that shaming the Supreme Court constituted a violation of the right to free speech. While fair criticism was a legal defence, it was subject to reasonable limitations under Article 19(2) due to public interest concerns. The Court noted, among other things, that judicial criticism was not protected under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution and amounted to contempt. When there was a contradiction between freedom of expression and maintaining judicial independence, one could not win.

"While it was not possible to control the thinking process and words functioning in one individual's mind, when it came to expression, it had to be within the constitutional bounds," the Court concluded. Without a doubt, legitimate criticism of the system is desirable while exercising one's right to free expression, and judges cannot be overly sensitive, even when distortions and criticism go too far. The same cannot, however, be expanded to allow nasty and scandalous statements. The contemnor's other arguments were similarly dismissed for similar reasons."

As a result, instead of a harsh punishment, Prashant Bhushan was convicted to a modest fine of INR 1.

Gautam Navlakha v. National Investigation Agency SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1796/2021

Citation - SLP (CRIMINAL) NO. 1796/2021

Bench - K.M. Joseph and U.U. Lalit

Date of Judgement: May 12, 2021

Introduction:

Gautam Navlakha is charged in the Bhima-Koregaon case and is suspected of being one of the perpetrators of the violence. His bail application was initially denied due to his ties to the maoists and Elgar-Parishad under the UAPA. Following that, the accused was asked to surrender to the National Investigation Agency, where it was discovered that the accused met with Syed Ghulam Nabi Fai (the Maoist group's commander) to combine and fight against government forces in order to beat them physically and mentally. Navlakha is another person who has been vocal in writing against the administration, and he gained notoriety after being denied access to Kashmir and labelled a threat.

Facts of the case:

Navlakha was detained at his home in Delhi on charges related to the Bhima-koregaon case. The accused was placed under house arrest by the Delhi High Court for 34 days, from August 28 to October 1, 2018. The arrest was declared illegal by the Delhi High Court on the 34th day. Following that, the accused was placed in 11 days of police custody and 46 days of judicial custody; at this point, he had served 90 days of his sentence and applied for bail at the Bombay High Court; however, the court denied the bail application, stating that house arrest had protected the accused's liberty. The accused was ordered by the Supreme Court to surrender to the NIA within three weeks on March 16, 2020, and he did so on April 4, 2020.

The accused's counsel submitted a habeas corpus writ to the Supreme Court, which was granted.

Issues

1. Whether a period of 34 days when Navlakha was in custody by way of house arrest would count as custody for the purpose of default bail?
2. Whether the apex court would entertain Writ of habeas corpus in a case where remand order has already been issued?

Laws

1. Article 32, constitution of India
2. Section 153A, 505(1B) and 34 and Section 120(B) IPC
3. Sections 13, 16, 17, 18, 18B, 20, 38 and 40, Unlawful Activities Prevention Act

Contentions made by petitioner

Navlakha had already served 90 days in detention, according to the accused's lawyer, and thus is eligible for default bail.

The counsel further claimed that the Delhi High Court had already overturned the arrest and declared it illegal, citing the case of Romila Thapar v. Union of India as an example.

The counsel also argued that because the accused was constantly interrogated by police officers while under house arrest, it should not be included in the period of default bail because he was completely cut off from the outside world – he couldn't leave his house, he couldn't meet anyone except police officers, lawyers, and ordinary house residents.

Contentions made by Respondent

Even though he was charged with serious crimes, the National Investigation Agency offered him a residence and did not treat him like a regular criminal, according to the attorney.

The counsel contended that because the magistrate's authorization was found to be invalid by the Delhi High Court, the entire detention was illegitimate, and so the incarceration under Section 167 of the CrPC is utterly undesirable, rendering the default bail scenario unclaimable.

The counsel also stated that the Delhi high court had suspended the transit remand and set it aside, ruling that detention was unconstitutional and that there had been no allowed custody by a magistrate's order.

Judgement

The hon'ble supreme court dismissed the writ of habeas corpus and dismissed the accused's bail plea, plainly stating that "home arrest" is not included in the time period required for default bail.

In its decision, the Supreme Court said unequivocally that a Writ of Habeas Corpus will only be considered against a remand order if the remand is wholly unconstitutional or was acquired by orders of a court with no power to do so.

The petition of the accused was dismissed by the Supreme Court because it had not been passed by a court with erroneous jurisdiction and was not fully illegitimate.

Ganesh Patel v. Umakant Rajoria, S.L.P. (CRL.) NO. 9313 OF 2021

Citation - S.L.P. (CRL.) NO. 9313 OF 2021

Bench - Sanjiv Khanna and Bela M. Trivedi

Facts of the Case

In this case, the accused filed a plea with the High Court under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, claiming that he and the defacto complainant had reached an agreement. The High Court ruled in favour of the petition. Following that, the de-facto complainant filed an application for the order to be recalled, claiming that it was made in his absence and based on incorrect information. The High Court granted the application and overturned the previous order. The appellant challenged the order of recall before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

Issue

Whether the application for recall of the order was maintainable?

Laws

1. S. 482, CrPc
2. S. 362 CrPc

Arguments By The Appellants

The appellant relied on Section 362 CrPC in his appeal to the Apex Court, which states that "except as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other for the time being in force, no Court shall alter or review a judgement or final order disposing of a case after it has been signed, except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error."

Judgement

"This appeal for recall of the order was maintainable because it was an application seeking a procedural review, not a substantive review under Section 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973," the Apex Court bench stated while dismissing the accused's Special Leave Petition. Grindlays Bank Ltd. v. Central Government

Industrial Tribunal & Ors. 1980 (supp) SCC 420 was cited by the court in this regard. The expression 'review' is used in two distinct senses, namely (1) a procedural review which is either inherent or implied in a court or Tribunal to set aside a palpably erroneous order passed under its misapprehension, and (2) a review on merits when the error sought to be corrected is one of law and is apparent on the face of the record, as stated by the court in Grindlays Bank. In the latter meaning, the Court in Narshi Thakershi's case decided that no review lies on merits unless the status expressly allows such. Obviously, when a review is sought because of a procedural flaw, the Tribunal's unintended error must be addressed ex debito justitiae to prevent misuse of its procedure, and every court or Tribunal has this ability.

The court also cited a decision in Budhia Swain and Others v. Gopinath Deb (1999), which explains the difference between recall and review and when a recall order might be issued. The High Court was correct in recalling the order and scheduling a hearing and determination on the merits, according to the court.

Devilal v. State of Madhya Pradesh

Citation - Criminal Appeal No: 989 of 2007

Court - Supreme Court of India

Bench - Uday Umesh Lalit and K.M. Joseph

Date of Judgement - 25th of February, 2021

“In this case, the Court considered to what extent could the benefit under the Juvenile Justice Act be extended where the offender was above 16 years and less than 18 years of age on the day the offence was committed.

The Court held that in such a case, even if the accused were guilty, the matter must be remitted to the jurisdictional Juvenile Justice Board.”

Facts of the Case:

In F.I.R. no: 212 of 1998, filed at 11:10 p.m. on July 19, 1998, Ganeshram stated that on July 14, 1998, while walking to his house, he saw Devilal armed with a Kulhari, his son armed with a talvar, and Amritlal armed with a lathi in front of Devilal's residence. Ganeshram was abused by Devilal, who referred to him as a Chamar and claimed that Chamars had advanced too far. Then Devilal and his son, Amritlal, beat Ganeshram with their Kulahri, Talvar, and lathis, fractured his right hand, cut his right calve, kicked him in the face below both eyes, and the swelling was visible at the time of the report, Ganeshram screamed for help, and his mother Gattubai, wife Sajan Bai, and sister-in-law Saman Bai came out to protect him. While guarding Ganeshram, Saman Bai was struck in the elbow by Devilal's lathi. Ganeshram's sister-in-law and Satyanarain then loaded him into a tractor and drove him to the police station to fill out an F.I.R.

Ganeshram died at 1.00 a.m. while being treated at Mandasaur District Hospital while Kothari was completing the legalities.

By its judgement and order dated 01.05.1998, the Trial Court found that the FIR recorded at the instance of the deceased could be relied upon as a dying declaration, Sajjan Bai, Saman Bai, and Laxminarayan, as well as the recoveries at the instances of accused Devilal, Gokul, and AmratRam, proved the prosecution's case. The prosecution had proved the offence under section 302 read with section 34 IPC, according to the trial court.

The case against Gattubai, on the other hand, was deemed to be unproven, and it was also determined that none of the defendants could be charged with crimes punishable under the SC-ST Act.

The Juvenile Justice Act of 1986 was in effect when the offence was committed in 1998, and it stated that anyone under the age of 16 was deemed a juvenile. Amrat Ram, Devilal's second son, was 16 years, 11 months, and 26 days old at the time the crime was committed. As a result, he was plainly not a minor under the Juvenile Justice Act of 1986. However, under the requirements of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act of 2000, this age was raised to 18. The Supreme Court had ordered the sessions court to investigate and report on the matter of juvenility.

Issue

At the commission of crime in 1998, the Juvenile Justice Act 1986 was in force, which stated that any person below the age of 16 was considered a juvenile. The age of Amrat Ram, the second son of Devilal, was 16 years, 11 months and 26 days at the time of commission of the offence. Therefore, he clearly wasn’t a juvenile within the meaning of Juvenile Justice Act 1986. But this age was raised to 18 in terms of provisions of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000. The Supreme Court had directed the sessions court to investigate this issue of juvenility and submit the report.

Laws

1. Section 34 of Indian Penal Code
2. Section 302 of Indian Penal Code
3. Section 342 of Indian Penal Code
4. Section 20 of Juvenile Justice Act 2000

Arguments and Decision of the Court:

The prosecution showed that Devilal and his two sons were guilty under Sections 302 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code by the decision and order of the trial court (05.01.1999). It's also worth noting that, despite the alleged caste-based altercation, the court did not find them guilty of crimes punishable under the SC/ST Act. A separate judgement found the appellants guilty of violating Sections 342 and 34 of the IPC and sentenced them to life in prison and a punishment of Rs. 5000/- each.

Later, the appellants filed a Criminal Appeal 700 of 1999 at the High Court, requesting that Dr. Kothari's medical evidence be considered. They argued that it was exceedingly unlikely that the deceased, Ganeshram, would have given any statements to the police prior to succumbing to the injuries that led to the filing of the FIR in this case. The High Court rejected the appellants contentions and thus upheld Devilal's conviction and sentence, as well as that of his sons Gokul and Amrat Ram, and dismissed the accused's Criminal Appeal No. 700 of 1999. This decision was handed out on September 14, 2006.

Furthermore, it was claimed that Amrat Ram, Devilal's second son, was a minor at the time the crime was committed. The statement of the accused's juvenility could be presented for the first time before the Court in light of the Hari Ram vs. State of Rajasthan ruling. The Sessions Judge, Neemach, was directed by this Court to conduct an inquiry into this issue of juvenility by order dated 3.10.2018, and it was discovered that the accused, Amrat Ram, was 16 years, 11 months and 26 days old in 1998, and he was found to be a juvenile for the purposes of the Juvenile Justice Act 2000 on the date of the offence.

Because the age of juvenility was raised to 18 years by the Juvenile Justice Act 2000, it was now up for discussion what should be done with the accused's juvenility. It was noted that, notwithstanding anything in this Act, all proceedings in respect of a juvenile pending in any court on the date on which this Act comes into force, if the court finds that the juvenile has committed an offence, it shall record such finding and, rather than passing any sentence in respect of the juvenile, forward the juvenile to the Board, which shall deal with the juvenile in accordance with the Juvenile Justice Act 2020.

Thus, Amrat must be remitted to the jurisdictional Juvenile Justice Board for determining appropriate quantum of fine that should be levied up on him.