Chagnon v. Syndicat de la fonction publique et parapublique du Québec
| Date | 2018-10-05 |
| Neutral citation | 2018 SCC 39 |
| Report | [2018] 2 SCR 687 |
| Case number | 37543 |
| Judges | Wagner, Richard; Abella, Rosalie Silberman; Moldaver, Michael J.; Karakatsanis, Andromache; Gascon, Clément; Côté, Suzanne; Brown, Russell; Rowe, Malcolm; Martin, Sheilah |
| On appeal from | Quebec |
Coram:
- Majority: Justice Andromache Karakatsanis (Wagner C.J., Abella, Moldaver, Gascon, and Martin JJ. concurring)
- Concurring: Justice Malcolm Rowe
- Dissenting: Justices Suzanne Côté and Russell Brown
Case Summary:
This case involved the Speaker of Quebec’s National Assembly, who fired three security guards for allegedly misusing Assembly cameras to observe people in nearby hotel rooms. The union representing the guards filed grievances on their behalf, arguing that the firings were wrongful and should be subject to the usual grievance process under the collective agreement.
Key Legal Issues:
- Parliamentary Privilege: Whether the Speaker’s decision to fire the security guards was protected by parliamentary privilege, thereby shielding it from review by a labour arbitrator.
- Scope of Privilege: The extent to which parliamentary privilege covers decisions related to employee management and the exclusion of strangers from the legislature.
Lower Court Decisions:
- Arbitrator: Ruled in favor of the security guards, stating that the Speaker’s decision to fire them was not protected by parliamentary privilege.
- Superior Court of Quebec: Overturned the arbitrator’s decision, agreeing with the Speaker that the decision was covered by privilege.
- Court of Appeal of Quebec: Reversed the Superior Court’s decision, ruling against the Speaker and holding that parliamentary privilege did not apply.
Supreme Court of Canada Ruling:
Majority Opinion (Justice Karakatsanis):
- Parliamentary Privilege: The Speaker’s decision to fire the security guards was not protected by parliamentary privilege. The majority held that parliamentary privilege should be limited to decisions that are necessary for the legislature to fulfill its constitutional role independently and with dignity. While security is crucial to the legislature’s function, not every decision about security management falls under privilege. The Speaker could still fire the guards, but he must follow the standard civil servant procedures.
- Outcome: The case was sent back to the arbitrator for a decision on the merits of the grievance. The majority emphasized the importance of ensuring that privilege does not overly restrict the rights of employees to have their grievances heard.
Concurring Opinion (Justice Rowe):
- Justice Rowe agreed with the majority’s decision to send the case back to the arbitrator but based his reasoning on the Act Respecting the National Assembly. He argued that the Assembly had already defined its use of privilege through this Act, which provided a procedure for employee management. Since the Act was not followed in this case, privilege could not be invoked to override the legislated process.
Dissenting Opinion (Justices Côté and Brown):
- The dissenting justices would have ruled in favor of the Speaker. They argued that the Speaker’s decision to fire the security guards was closely linked to the Assembly’s ability to perform its constitutional duties, particularly regarding security. Therefore, the decision was protected by parliamentary privilege, and an arbitrator should not have the power to review it.
The Supreme Court’s decision clarified the limits of parliamentary privilege, particularly concerning employee management and security. The majority held that parliamentary privilege should not be used to avoid standard grievance procedures unless the decision is directly necessary for the legislature to fulfill its constitutional role. The case underscored the balance between protecting legislative independence and ensuring fair treatment of employees.
