Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503; 106 S. Ct. 1310; 89 L. Ed. 2d 478 (1986)
Facts—The petitioner was an ordained Orthodox Jew and a commissioned officer in the U.S. Air Force. In uniform and on duty but in violation of Air Force dress regulations, Goldman claimed the regulations prevented him from wearing his yarmulke (skullcap) in violation of his First Amendment right to freedom of religion. Continued violation of the Air Force dress regulations, he was warned, would lead to a court-martial. Goldman brought suit against the secretary of defense and others. The U.S. District Court granted Goldman injunctive relief against the application of dress regulations but the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed it. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Question—Does the free exercise clause of the First Amendment allow a Jewish officer who is also a rabbi to wear a yarmulke in violation of an Air Force dress regulation?
Decision—No.
Reasons—J. Rehnquist (5–4). The Court has repeatedly held that “the military is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society” and “the military must insist upon a respect for duty and discipline without counterpart in civilian life.” The military need not encourage debate or tolerate protest to the extent “that such tolerance is required of the civilian state by the First Amendment.” To accomplish its mission “the military must foster instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and an esprit de corps.” Courts must give great deference concerning “the relative importance of a particular military interest.” Uniforms encourage a sense “of hierarchical unity by tending to eliminate outward individual distinctions except for those of rank. The Air Force considers them as vital during peace time as during war . . . habits of discipline and unity must be developed in advance of trouble.” But whether or not expert witnesses “may feel that religious exceptions . . . are desirable is quite beside the point. The desirability of dress regulations in the military is decided by the appropriate military officials, and they are under no constitutional mandate to abandon their considered professional judgment.”
Note—Interpreting this case as an example of statutory construction, Congress subsequently adopted legislation permitting members of the armed forces to wear yarmulkes.
