Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422; 76 S. Ct. 497; 100 L. Ed. 511 (1956)
Facts—Congress in 1954 passed the Immunity Act providing that whenever, in the judgment of a U.S. attorney, the testimony of any witness, or the production of books, papers, or other evidence by any witness, in any case or proceeding before any grand jury or court of the United States involving any interference with or endangering of national security (including certain specified federal statutes) is necessary to the public interest, the U.S. attorney, upon the approval of the attorney general, shall make application to the court for an order to the witness to testify. However, the witness cannot subsequently be prosecuted in any court on the basis of the testimony he then gives.
William L. Ullmann refused to answer questions regarding espionage activity before a grand jury of the Southern District of New York despite the statutory provision of immunity, and he was convicted of contempt.
Question—Is the protection Congress provided in the Immunity Act of 1954 sufficiently broad to displace the protection afforded by the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination?
Decision—Yes.
Reasons—J. Frankfurter (7–2). The Immunity Act protects a witness who is compelled to answer to the extent of his constitutional immunity, that is, giving testimony that might possibly expose him to a criminal charge. The immunity thus granted by the statute is also effective as against state action. “We cannot say that Congress’s paramount authority in safeguarding national security does not justify the restriction it has placed on the exercise of state power for the more effective exercise of conceded federal power.” The Court noted that the sole concern of the privilege against self-incrimination “is, as its name indicates, with the danger to a witness forced to give testimony leading to the infliction of ‘penalties affixed to the criminal acts. ’ Immunity displaces the danger. Once the reason for the privilege ceases, the privilege ceases.”
The Court also noted that the act does not impose a nonjudicial function on the District Court since this court has no discretion to deny an application for an order requiring a witness to answer, assuming that the statutory requirements have been met.
In dissent, J. Douglas argued for a wider view of the Fifth Amendment as a protection for the rights of conscience and dignity and as protection against testimony that might lead to “infamy and disgrace.”
Note—In Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972) the Court distinguished between “use immunity,” coextensive with the guarantee of the Fifth Amendment, and “transactional immunity,” wider than the Fifth Amendment. The Court has said only the former immunity is required.